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TWO CONCEPTIONS OF THE
NINTH AMENDMENT
RANDY

E. BARNETT*

The Ninth Amendment has been largely ignored by the
Supreme Court of the United States. Because the Ninth
Amendment is unquestionably a part of our written Constitution, ignoring it would not have been possible without some
theory that renders it without any function. This paper will first
examine this theory, which is based on what I call the "rightspowers conception" of constitutional rights, a conception of
constitutional rights that is applied only to the Ninth Amendment. Then I will describe an alternative to this view of the
Ninth Amendment, one that is based on what I call the "powerconstraint conception" of constitutional rights, the conception
that we normally use with constit1;1tional rights., Lastly I will
briefly address the topic of this part of the Symposium: "The
Ninth Amendment and its Relationship to Natural Rights."
THE RIGHTS-POWERS CONCEPTION OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT

The rights-powers conception stipulates that the rights "retained by the people" are nothing other than the exact converse of the powers granted to the national government. This
view was put forward in 1980 by Raoul Berger 1 and most recently by Charles Cooper in his article, "Limited Government
and Individual Liberty: The Ninth Amendment's Forgotten
Lessons." 2 As Cooper explains: "A ninth amendment claim
againstfederal action ... is determined by the extent of the federal government's enumerated powers .... " 3
.
Far from being a "forgotten lesson," however, the rightspowers conception has been explicitly used by the Supreme
Court to interpret the Ninth Amendment. As Justice Reed
wrote in the 194 7 case of United Public Workers v. Mitchell:
• Visiting Scholar, Northwestern University School of Law; Professor of Law, Illinois Institute ofTechnology, Chicago-Kent College of Law. The thesis presented here
is greatly expanded in Barnett, Reconceiving the .Vinth Amendment, 74 CoRN. L. REv.
{forthcoming 1989), and Barnett, Foreword: The Ninth Amendment and Constitutional Legitimacy in Symposium on Interpreting the Xintk Amendment, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 37 (1988).
1. See Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 CoRNELL L. REv. 1 {1980).
2. Cooper, Limited Government and Individual Liberty: The Xinth Amendment's Forgotten
Lessons, 4 J. LAw & PoL. 63 {1987).
3. /d. at 78.
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The powers granted by the Constitution to the Federal Government are subtracted from the totality of sovereignty originally in the states and the people. Therefore, when
objection is made that the exercise of a federal power infringes upon rights reserved by the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, the inquiry must be directed toward the
granted power under which the action of the Union was
taken. If granted power is found, necessarily the objection of
invasion of those rights, reserved by the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, must fail. 4

There are three serious problems with this interpretation of the
Ninth Amendment.
First, this interpretation treats the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as exactly the same. The Tenth Amendment reads:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States, respectively, or to the people. 5

The idea that animates the rights-powers conception that powers not delegated are reser\red is clearly expressed here. If the
only intention of the Framers was to state the theory of enumerated powers, the Tenth Amendment was entirely sufficient
to the task. There was absolutely no need for another amendment written confusingly in terms of "rights" retained by the
people to express exactly the same idea.
The confusion between the Ninth and Tenth Amendments is
manifested in Justice Reed's reference to "those rights, reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments .... " 6 The Tenth
Amendment, of course, does not speak of rights at all, but
rather speaks of reserved "powers." And, in his article, Charles
Cooper states that "[t]he ninth amendment does not specify
what rights it protects other than by its reference to the enumerated powers of the federal government." 7 The Ninth
Amendment, of course, does not refer to enumerated powers
at all. It is the Tenth Amendment that speaks of "powers not
delegated to the United States."
The second problem with the "rights-powers conception"
flows from its claim that there can never be a conflict between a
constitutional right and a delegated power. If this is correct,
4.
5.
6.
7.

330 u.s. 75, 95-96 (1947).
U.S. CoNST. amend. X.
330 U.S. 75, 96 (1947) (emphasis added).
Cooper, supra note 2, at 80 (emphasis added).
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then the Ninth Amendment has absolutely no constitutional
role. Any claim by an individual or state that the national government had exceeded its enumerated powers would rely entirely upon the provisions enumerating the powers of the
national government (to show the absence of a power) and the
language of the Tenth Amendment (to show that those powers
not delegated are reserved).
The fact that there would be no occasion to use the Ninth
Amendment is not the problem. Mter all, there has been no
occasion to enforce the rule requiring the President to be at
least thirty-five years old, either. The problem is that a rightspowers conception deprives the Ninth Amendment of any potential application. It does not allow for even a hypothetical set of
facts that would implicate the Ninth Amendment. Of course, it
is possible that the Congress approved and the States ratified
an amendment that was meant to be inapplicable to any conceivable circumstance. However, we cannot prefer such an interpretation of an expressed constitutional enactment if one that
contemplates a potential role is also available.
Finally, the rights-powers conception of constitutional rights
must apply to enumerated as well as unenumerated rights. According to a rights-powers analysis, by delegating a particular
power to the national government, the people necessarily
ceded to the general government any rights they previously
had that might conflict with such a power. According to this
view, the Bill of Rights merely clarified certain of the retained
rights and changed nothing. As Raoul Berger states: "Thus
viewed, the Bill of Rights added nothing, but was merely declaratory."8 Therefore, even an enumerated right should never
constrain an enumerated power. 9
It should come as no surprise that a rights-powers conception is so broad as to deny effect to enumerated as well as
unenumerated rights. The rights-powers conception is based
on the argument made by some Federalists such as James Wilson and Alexander Hamilton that it was unnecessary to have
any enumerated rights because the national government was
one of limited and enumerated powers. When this argument
was made, the issue of unenumerated rights had yet to arise.
B. Berger, supra note I, at 6 (footnote omitted).
9. Charles Cooper's discussion of the First Amendment appears to adopt this interpretive method. See Cooper, supra note 2, at 74-75.
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Yet the rights-powers argument was not universally accepted
by the Framers. When, for example, Thomas Jefferson vigorously objected to this argument in a letter to James Madison, 10
Madison replied that he did not accept the position "in the extent argued by Mr. Wilson ... .'' 11 Moreover, the argument that
an enumeration of rights was unnecessary was rejected by the
electorate when they ratified the Bill of Rights. It is odd indeed
to insist that the only proper interpretation of the Bill of Rights
is based on the theory used by its most vociferous opponents.
Ironically, the rights-powers conception has been applied
only to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, thereby neutering
the very provisions that were inserted to respond to the concerns expressed by Federalists. In contrast, enumerated rights
have been used to limit in some fashion the exercise of delegated powers. As the Court stated in the 1951 case of Dennis v.
United States: 12
The question with which we are concerned here is not
whether Congress has such a power, but whether the means
which it has employed conflict with the First and Fifth
Amendments to the Constitution. 13

Once it is conceded that enumerated rights can constrain the
exercise of delegated powers, however, it must be explained
why a fundamentally different conception of constitutional
rights applies to the "retained" rights of the Ninth Amendment. This is particularly awkward in the face of the Ninth
Amendment dictate that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by 'the people." 14 Rendering the Ninth
Amendment functionless by applying a rights-power concep10. Jefferson wrote:
To say, as Mr. Wilson does that a bill of rights was not necessary because all is
reserved in the case of the general government which is not given, while in the
particular ones all is given which is not reserved might do for the Audience to
whom it was addressed, but is surely gratis dictum, opposed by strong inferences from the body of the instrument, as well as from the omission of the
clause of our present confederation which had declared that in expressed
terms.
Letter of Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, (Dec. 20, 1787), repri11ted i11 1 B.
SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 606-07 (1971).
11. Letter ofJames Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), id. at 615.
12. 341 u.s. 494 (1951).
13. /d. at 501 (emphasis in original); see also Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S.
109, 112 (1959) ("Congress ... must exercise its powers subject to the ... relevant
limitations of the Bill of Rights.") .
. 14. U.S. CoNST. amend. IX.
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tion only to the rights "retained by the people" surely disparages these rights, if indeed it does not deny them altogether.
THE POWER-CONSTRAINT CONCEPTION OF THE
NINTH AMENDMENT

The idea that constitutional rights are simply what is left over
after the people have delegated powers flies in the face of the
amendments themselves. For example, it is simply impossible
to find a right to "a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury," 15 a right against doublejeopardy or self-incrimination, 16
or a right to be free from "unreasonable searches and
seizures" 17 by closely examining the limits of the enumerated
powers of the national government. The reason for this is that
the delegated powers provisions limit the proper ends or scope
of federal powers, while these examples of enumerated rights
limit the means by which the federal government may use those
powers that are within its proper scope.
This insight points the way to a different conception of enumerated and unenumerated constitutional rights: the "powerconstraint" conception. Madison explained that the proposed
amendments had not one, but two distinct purposes: "[T]he
great object in view is to limit and qualify the powers of Government, by excepting out of the grant of power those cases in
which Government ought not to act, or to act only in a particular mode." 18 One purpose is, then, "to limit . .. the powers of
government, by excepting out of the grant of power those cases
in which Government ought not to act ...." Another purpose is
"to . . . qualify the powers of Government, by excepting out of
the grant of power those cases in which Government ought ...
to act only in a particular mode." In other words, a Bill of Rights
was meant to constrain the powers of government in two
ways-by reinforcing the limitations on the delegated powers
of government and by placing additional restrictions on the
means by which government may pursue its delegated ends.
In explaining the second of these purposes, Madison offers
an illuminating example:
15. U.S. CoNST. amend. VI.
16. U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
17. U.S. CoNST. amend. IV.
18. 1 ANNALS OF CoNG. 454 (J. Gales & W. Seaton eds. 1834) (Speech of Rep. J.
Madison) [hereinafter "Madison"].
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The General Government has a right to pass all laws which
shall be necessary to collect its revenue; the means for enforcing the collection are within the direction of the Legislature: may not general warrants be considered necessary for
the purpose ... ? If there was reason for restraining the
State Governments from exercising this power, there is like
reason for restraining the Federal Government. 19
In addition to supporting the view that constitutional rights
were intended, to use Madison's term, "as actuallimitations" 20
on the exercise of delegated powers, this example also suggests
that constitutional rights are especially important because the
open-ended language of the Necessary and Proper Clause21
heightens the chances that the government may exercise a delegated power in a manner that infringes upon the rights of the
people. Even so strong a proponent of the Necessary and
Proper Clause as James Madison argued that it increased the
need for constitutional rights. "It is true," he told the House,
the powers of the General Government are circumscribed,
they are directed to particular objects; but even if Government
keeps within those limits, it has certain discretionary powers with respect to the means, which may admit of abuse to a certain extent, .•.
because in the Constitution of the United States, there is a
clause granting to Congress the power to make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested in the Government of the United
States, or in any department or officer thereof ....22
This quote refutes the claim of Raoul Berger and Charles
Cooper that constitutional rights are defined solely by the
enumeration of delegated powers. Madison states that "even if
Government keeps within those limits, it has certain discretion19. !d. at 456.
20. Madison's original formulation of what eventually became the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments read:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor of particular rights, shall not be construed as to diminish the just importance of other
rights retained by the people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the
constitution; but either as actual limitations ofsuch powers, or as inserted merely
for greater caution.
/d. at 452 (emphasis added) .
. 21. After enumerating specific powers of Congress, the Constitution authorizes the
Congress:
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested in this Constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
22. Madison, supra note 18, at 455 (emphasis added).
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ary powers with respect to the means, which may admit of
abuse to a certain extent .... "In short, in addition to reinforcing the limitations on delegated power, constitutional rights
are also intended to further restrict the means by which the
government may pursue its delegated ends.
Even where constitutional rights do simply reinforce the limits of delegated powers, it is dangerously misleading to characterize them as "redundant." Such a characterization implies
that constitutional rights automatically recede as the exercise of
governmental powers expands. Of course, if the government is
held within its enumerated powers, then constitutional rights
will not be needed for this purpose. But if the scope of governmental powers is improperly expanded, constitutional rights do
not simply recede into oblivion. Rather they serve the same
function as the backup safety mechanisms on airplanes. These
so-called "redundant" secondary systems are designed to prevent a crash if a primary system fails. Just as redundancy is
designed into airplanes for "greater caution," 23 (to again borrow a phrase from Madison) constitutional rights that reinforce
the limitations on governmental powers are an indispensible
second line of defense against unwarranted expansions of
powers.
To change the analogy, when a ship begins to sink, it would
be a non sequitur to argue that one should not use lifeboats
and lifepreservers because the designers of the ship's structure
ardently believed such devices were entirely unnecessary. In
the same way, when the constitutional structure of enumerated
powers no longer effectively prevents violations of individual
rights, it is a non sequitur to object to the enforcement of enumerated and unenumerated constitutional rights on the
grounds that those who designed the structure of the Constitution as the primary mechanism for protecting individual rights
believed that the enforcement of such rights would be
unnecessary.
On the issue of whether a Bill of Rights is needed to reinforce the limitations on federal power, history has proved the
Federalists wrong and the Antifederalists right. We should be
grateful to those who withheld their assent to the Constitution
until they were assured that an expressed recognition of consti23. See supra note 20.
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tutional rights was forthcoming and to James Madison who succeeded in persuading a reluctant House of Representatives to
take up the issue.
We are now in a position to fully appreciate Madison's statement that:
If a line can be drawn between the powers granted and the
rights retained, it would seem to be the same thing, whether
the latter to be secured by declaring that they shall not be
abridged, or whether the former shall not be extended. If no
such line can be drawn, a declaration in either form would
. amount to nothing. 24

Contrary to both Raoul Berger and Charles Cooper, this statement does not unambiguously support a rights-powers conception of constitutional rights. Rather, Madison is saying that
there are two ways of limiting the power of government: restrict powers and protect rights. Madison is not suggesting that
the latter is derived from the former. Nor is he suggesting that
when one of these two mechanisms fails to constrain government, we cannot resort to the other.
According to a power-constraint conception, constitutional
rights have two vital functions: (I) they place limits on the
means by which delegated powers can be exercised and (2) they
provide a back-up mechanism by which government may be
held to its proper ends. In part of his original version of what
became the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, Madison articulated both aspects of this conception: "The exceptions here or
elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor of particular
rights, shall ... be construed ... either as actual limitations of
such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution. " 25
The only question that remains is whether the enumerated
rights standing alone are adequate to either of these two
power-constraining tasks. The answer is as obvious today as it
was to the Framers. 26 There is no telling in advance exactly
how the powers authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause
may be abused. And, once the scheme of delegated powers is
24. Letter of james Madison to George Washington (Dec. 5, 1789), reprinted in
Schwartz, supra note 10, at 432.
25. Madison, supra note 18, at 452. The entire passage appears at supra note 20.
26. Madison's original draft articulated this view as well:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in favor of particular rights, shall not be construed as to diminish the just importance of other
rights retained by the people ...."
/d.
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eroded, there is no telling what rights the national government
may violate. Because he shared other Framers' beliefs that the
enumerated rights did not exhaust the rights of the people,
Madison wrote the Ninth Amendment lest the absence of a
right from the list lead to the inference that it had been surrendered up to the government. 27
Trying to preserve limited government without recourse to
unenumerated rights retained by the people is a project
doomed to failure. Thanks to James Madison's Ninth Amendment the Constitutional recognition of rights retained by the
people cannot be denied.
THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND NATURAL RIGHTS

What then is the relation between the Ninth Amendment and
natural rights? There is both a positive and a normative dimension to this relationship.
First, as I said in my remarks at the 1986 Federalist Society
Symposium at Stanford Law School, 28 as a matter of positive
constitutional law, the Ninth Amendment, and therefore the
Constitution as a whole, assumes the validity of a philosophy of
"first comes rights-then comes government" and implicitly
rejects a "_government first-rights second" philosophy. The
Ninth Amendment speaks of rights that are "retained by the
people" which means that the people had these rights prior to
the formation of this government. It affirms the proposition
that governments are established to secure, not to create rights. 29
If the view that people have rights independent of their crea.:.
tion by government may fairly be called a philosophy of "natural rights," then as a matter of positive law, the Ninth
27. In Madison's words:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which
were not placed in that enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that
those rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the
hands of the General Government, and were consequently insecure. This is
one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the admission of a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be
guarded against.
/d. at 456.
28. See Barnett, Are Enumerated Constitutional Rights the Only Rights JVe Have?: The Case of
Assodational Freedom, 10 HARV.J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 101 (1987)
29. I have also pointed out, however, that the Constitution does create certain "institutional" rights as further safeguards against governmental abuse. See id. at 108-110.
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Amendment, and therefore the Constitution, assumes the legitimacy of a natural rights philosophy.
Consequently, as a matter of positive law a "government
first-rights second" philosophy that ignores unenumerated
rights provides a grossly distorted interpretation of the Constitution. Such a view converts a partial list of enumerated rights
into what Stephen Macedo has called, "islands surrounded by a
sea of governmental powers" 30-precisely the false interpretation that Hamilton and Wilson warned against. Given their objective of limiting the power of government, had they shared a
"government first-rights second" philosophy, those who insisted on a Bill of Rights would never have settled for the few
rights that were enumerated. Therefore, when evaluating legislation, at a minimum, we must look to the kinds of unenumerated rights that were thought to exist at the time of the framing.
There are at least three textual sources of unenumerated
rights. First, certain rights are presupposed by provisions of the
Constitution itself-for example, the rights to life, liberty, and
property, as well as the obligation of contracts. Second, we may
look to the rights that some state ratification conventions proposed be added to the new Constitution. Third, we may look to
philosophical writings of the day. For example, James Wilson
(an ardent opponent of enumerating rights) devoted an entire
chapter of his treatise to natural rights. 31
Text alone is not enough, however. The rule of law requires
that legal rights be as internally consistent and coherent as possible. This means that we cannot escape the task of devising a
theory that best explains the bulk of these rights and which tells
us which of them are valid and which are not. A good example
of this kind of approach is Richard Epstein's book on the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 32 The claim that any legal
system that strives for coherence must resort at some level to
theory should shock no one. After all, the "rights-powers conception" of constitutional rights is itselfjust a theory offered to
explain certain passages of the Constitution.
The other dimension of the relation between natural rights
30. S. MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT v. THE CoNSTITUTION 32 (rev. ed. 1987).
31. See J. Wilson, Of the Natural Rights of Individuals, in 2 THE WoRKS OF jAMES
WILSON 307 (J. Andrews ed. 1896).
32. R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPER"IY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
(1985).
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and the Ninth Amendment is normative and concerns the legitimacy of legislation that results from the operation of constitutional processes. Why is it that any legislation (to use a phrase
from Aquinas) binds a person "in conscience" 33 today? The
mere fact that the individual cannot successfully resist the coercion of government does not explain why a citizen or government official is bound in conscience to obey legislation
produced by constitutional processes, even if he or she could
avoid a sanction. Might does not explain right; nor does the
fact that a majority of some minority once cast a vote in favor of
the Constitution.
If the Constitution imparts legitimacy on legislation such that
legislation commands an ongoing moral obligation of obedience, it must be because the processes established by the Constitution are sufficiendy in sync with a background set of
individual rights, rights that are both procedural and substantive in nature, corresponding to what Lon Fuller called the internal and external . moralities of law. 34 If this view of
constitutional legitimacy is correct, then the Ninth Amendment
helps to keep the institutions created by the Constitution in
line with these background rights. The Ninth Amendment enhances the legitimacy of legislation by strengthening the link
between enacted law that survives judicial review and the imperatives of justice based on individual rights.
What about the fear that openly protecting unenumerated
rights will lead to abuses by the judiciary? For example, what
would prevent judges from creating enforceable constitutional
(as opposed to statutory) welfare rights? While this is a genuine
concern, I suggest that the worst way to address the problem of
judicial abuses is to deny that courts may protect unenumerated rights, for this would amount to a preemptive surrender of
these rights to the far greater threat of legislative or executive
abuses. After all, it is Congress, not the courts, that has created
what it now refers to as "entitlements" programs.
Instead, the problem of judicial abuse is best addressed by
strongly insisting upon three formal constraints on judicial
power that restrict the scope of all constitutional rights. First,
33. T. AQ.UINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA in 20 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
233 (1980).
34. See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 96-97 (rev. ed. 1969).
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"substantive" constitutional rights are negative not positive. 35
They define protected domains of discretionary conduct with
which government may not interfere. "Procedural" constitutional rights may be positive, but they limit the way that government not private citizens exercises its proper powers. 36
Second, in protecting these rights, judges may exercise neither
legislative nor executive powers. They ought not, for example,
raise taxes or appropriate funds. Third, judges have only the
power to strike down legislation or executive actions. Judges
may only say "no"-andjudicial negation is not legislation.
So-called constitutional welfare rights would violate each of
these constraints. They are positive in nature, require the appropriation and expenditure of tax revenues, and cannot be implemented by striking down legislation. Of course, when
legislatures decide to dispense benefits through administrative
agencies or to provide government "services," judges are not
creating entitlements de novo when they insist that such schemes
be administered in a manner that is consistent with principles
of due process and equal protection. This is the price we pay
for using public as opposed to private institutions to achieve
social goals. Any such constitutional rights are ultimately statutory in their origin.
Although the unenumerated rights of the Ninth Amendment
would have an important role to play even within a government
whose powers were strictly limited, until the day that we reestablish this constitutional structure, our problem is not that
judges protect too many unenumerated rights from governmental interference, but that they protect all too few. While
there are plausible reasons why some are reluctant to extend
judicial review to the ·rights retained by the people, 37 the rightspowers conception of the Ninth Amendment is not one of
them. A power-constraint conception of constitutional rights
best explains what Madison was doing when he drafted the
amendments to the Constitution, including the provision that
eventually became the Ninth Amendment. Arguments for the
35. See Currie, Positive and Xegative Corutitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986).
36. See Barnett, Foreword: Four Serues of the "Public-Private" Distinction, 9 HARV. J .L. &
Pus. PoL'Y 267 (1986) (discussing the different meanings of the distinction between
"public" and "private" law).
37. Those wishing to read the seminal scholarship on both sides of this issue should
see THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH
AMENDMENT (R. Barnett ed. forthcoming). The latest round of the debate can be found
in the Symposium on Interpreting the Ninth Amendment, 64 Cm.-KENT c.REV. 37-268 (1988).
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rights-powers conception conceal what is actually at issue: the
merits of Madison's effort to constrain the powers of government and protect liberty by protecting enumerated and
unenumerated constitutional rights.

